The legacy of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe: Four contradictions in Japan’s national security strategyND Compass

Koichi Nakano, Sophia University

January 5, 2023

Shinzo Abe was murdered on July 8, 2022 while giving a campaign speech during the elections. The news was received by great shock in Japan and worldwide alike. Greater still was the discovery that the very same Unification Church was linked to the incident with which Mr. Abe and many members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have had a close relationship for several years. As time went on, public opinion in Japan turned mostly into criticism regarding the relationship between the LDP and the Unification Church. Also, public opposition rose against Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s plans to hold a state funeral - perhaps to distract attention from a thorough investigation, or perhaps to deify Mr. Abe.

Many foreign countries including the United States, Australia, and G7 members hold Mr. Abe’s security policy in high regard. His diplomatic endeavors are seen as Japan’s awakening from its postwar slumber of one-country pacifism. He is also praised for steering Japan towards strengthening its military power to confront China with the US and other Western countries, under the slogan of “proactive pacifism”. In Japan, however, his policies are not so favorably regarded. Hence the purpose of this paper is to point out four contradictions between the stipulations of Article 9 of the Constitution and Mr. Abe’s constant efforts to strengthen the Japan-US alliance and the Japanese military at the same time.

1. First Contradiction: Article 9 and the Right of Collective Self-defense

In July 2014, the cabinet decided to revise the constitution in favor of exercising the right to collective self-defense. The Abe administration said that “judging from its wording, Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit the use of force in international relations”. However, the Japanese people’s right to a peaceful existence, and also their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are all established in the preamble of the Constitution and in Article 13, respectively. Considering that the Constitution itself calls for the utmost care in national affairs and politics, Article 9 of the very same Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted as something that bans necessary measures to maintain national security.

At the same time, if a foreign armed attack posed imminent danger to Japanese people’s rights, self-defense could be seen as an unavoidable measure. As such, the minimum necessary use of force is deemed “acceptable”. The cabinet gave the following statement: “In light of the current security environment, we considered a scenario where a foreign country attacked not only Japan, but also other countries Japan has close ties with, and there was a clear danger to Japanese people’s right to life, freedom and the pursuit of happiness. In such a case, we would use military force to the minimum necessary extent to protect our citizens if no other appropriate measures were available. We have come to the conclusion that this should be considered constitutionally permissible as a measure for self-defense, based on the logic of the conventional government perspective."

The overwhelming majority of constitutional scholars and legal professionals, who supported the citizens’ protests against the security legislation in the summer of 2015, agree that the above interpretation is illogical. If Japan was threatened as a country even though it was not under attack, then that in itself would be a problem because in that case Japan would no longer be an independent country. However, it is absurd to say that Japanese people’s right to life, freedom and the pursuit of happiness, which is the foundation for exercising the right of self-defense, could be completely overturned. Rather, Japan engaging in war is the very thing that would threaten these rights.

2. Second Contradiction: Defense-only policy and the Alliance of Hope

It is possible to take measures according to Article 9 if the goal is to protect the rights of Japanese people and ensure Japan’s safety. The Japanese government itself called Article 9 the constitutional basis for not only the right to individual self-defense but also for the right to “limited” collective self-defense. Nevertheless, Mr. Abe spoke of something different to the US Congress before enacting the security legislation.

Below are some excerpts from his speech on April 29, 2015.

“Japan supports the ‘rebalance' policy of the US aiming at the Asia-Pacific for regional peace and security. I declare here and now that I am going to support you all throughout. Japan has recently formed stronger strategic ties with Australia and India. We are going to develop our cooperation with ASEAN countries and South Korea. With the Japan-US alliance as the cornerstone, and with the addition of these allies, our region shall become much more secure. …(omitted)... We must bring about a free and peaceful Indo-Pacific region where the rule of law governs. It is for this very reason that the Japan-US alliance must be strengthened. This is our responsibility. We are currently working on improving our national security laws. Once this work is finalized, Japan will be in a better position to give seamless responses, according to the severity of the crisis. This legislation will also strengthen the cooperation between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the US military, and make the Japan-US alliance even stronger. It will ensure deterrence for the peace of our region. This is the first major reform since the Second World War. We will see it realized by this summer.
… (omitted)... Ladies and gentlemen, representing the people of the United States. Let us call our alliance the Alliance of Hope. Let us join forces to make the world a better place. Alliance of Hope. Together, we can do it.”

It is clear that this is different from exercising the right of self-defense only to the extent permitted by Article 9 to protect the rights of Japanese people and the Asia-Pacific region from the rising power of China. The Alliance of Hope already goes beyond the “limited” right of self-defense and exclusive defense-oriented policies if it can respond “seamlessly” to regional crises and sets its sight on a global perspective. This is a double-tongued narrative.

3. Third Contradiction: Protection of Liberal Order and Anti-constitutionalism

The successors of the Abe administration continued advocating for a stronger US-Japan alliance and a stronger military in order to champion values such as the liberal international order, the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. However, the contradiction lies in such values being sidetracked in Japan.

Permission to exercise the right of collective self-defense, securing the ability to attack enemy bases, and increasing defense expenditures for that purpose go far beyond the boundaries laid down in Article 9. In addition, political moves ignorant of the Constitution and the democratic functions of the Diet have become rampant since the Abe administration. For example, Article 53, which allows opposition lawmakers to call for an extraordinary Diet session, was ignored under the Abe administration in 2015 and 2017, under the Suga administration in 2021, and under the Kishida administration in 2022, becoming somewhat of a normal occurrence. Such political recklessness is a display of contempt towards the monitoring function of the Diet, the highest organ of national sovereignty and representative of the Japanese people. Furthermore, the reserve funds have increased significantly during the three consecutive years after the start of the pandemic, seemingly bypassing parliamentary deliberations. There seems to be some sort of nonchalance about violating the constitutional Articles responsible for the principle of fiscal democracy: Articles 85 and 87 regulate exceptions to the reserve funds. Countless false statements in the Diet and numerous cases of official documents being falsified, concealed or destroyed only add fuel to the fire.

4. Fourth Contradiction: Establishing National Security through Strengthening the Military and the US-Japan Alliance

A single-minded focus on strengthening the US-Japan alliance and the military will invite nothing but more danger. The rise of political illiberalism and democratic backsliding became a common phenomenon not only in Japan but also in the United States and many European countries. Also, a scheme of democracy versus despotism was set up after the invasion of Ukraine. There seems to be a tendency among US-Japan security policy officials nowadays to fan the flames of the Taiwan Crisis, which will only bring Russia and China closer, and if things do not go well, the war in Europe will spread to Asia. Until just before his death, Mr. Abe had enthusiastically repeated that "an emergency in Taiwan is an emergency in Japan," urging the strengthening of the military and the Japan-US alliance. However, such a vision is clearly lacking the very principles of peaceful democracy and therefore brings a risk to national security.

5. The Only Choice: Guaranteeing Japan's Security through Constitutionalism and Peaceful Diplomacy

The four contradictions pointed out in this paper are already problematic. In addition, the current national security strategy not only fails to guarantee Japan’s security, but also exposes Japan to the risk of war. The Japanese government has been bypassing the rules of constitutionalism. As a result, no matter how much military power they amass, it will not have a deterrent effect. This is because arbitrary government authority is less predictable when it comes to military action. Deterrence means that there is a line drawn at going to war. It also means that a threatening message is to be sent to the opponent: if they cross the red line and attack Japan, military force will be used as a response. Deterrence is not solely synonymous with military power. No matter how much military power a country has, if deterrence cannot prevent war, it is a failure. The policies focused on militarization, ongoing since the Abe administration, constantly confirming that Article 9 will not change, and neither will the exclusive defense-oriented policy or liberal values. However, in reality, contradictory things are happening. From another country’s perspective, Japan’s previously clear narrative about going to war - namely, military force can be used to eliminate foreign threats when Japan’s territory is invaded and diplomacy cannot solve it - has now become unclear. Deterrence cannot prevent war.

Ultimately, there is no mutual recognition on what it means for Japan to engage in war if Japan keeps on focusing the military and the US-Japan alliance while talking about deterrence. This, in other words, is a lack of reassurance between Japan and other countries concerned. It increases the risk of a war that should be avoided in the first place. Even if we put the deterrence theory into practice, it is essential to give reassurance through disciplined constitutionalism and peace-centered diplomacy.

Koichi Nakano

Professor, Faculty of Liberal Arts, Department of Liberal Arts, Sophia University Visiting Scholar, Program on US-Japan Relations, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University